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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California law, a regular feature of 
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal deci-
sions of special importance to women. A brief 
analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised 
in each case is provided. 
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I. FAMILY LAW 
1. California Civil Code section 5125 (d) does not require that 
separate family businesses be awarded to the operating 
spouse in a marital dissolution action 
In re Marriage of Kozen, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 230 Cal. 
Rptr. 304 (2nd Dist. 1986). In In re Marriage of Kozen, the hus-
band appealed from the trial court's award of a successful fast 
food franchise and $105,000 in attorney and accountant fees to 
his wife in a marital dissolution action. On appeal the Second 
District affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial 
court because California Civil Code section 5125 (d) does not re-
quire that separate family businesses be granted to the operat-
ing spouse. 
James and June Kozen separated in 1981 after a thirteen 
and one-half year marriage. The marital dissolution proceedings 
took place in 1984. At that time June worked solely within the 
home for fifteen years. Her previous experience consisted of six 
or seven years working as a hairdresser. 
Eight years prior to the dissolution action, James entered 
into a partnership with Leonard Allenstein to operate Burger 
King franchises in Hollywood and Agoura. In a 1984 buyout 
agreement between the partners, James received the Hollywood 
restaurant, which he operated successfully, and Allenstein took 
the Agoura restaurant. The agreement required James to borrow 
$227,000 to payoff Allenstein. 
At the time of the marital dissolution, community assets 
consisted of the Hollywood franchise valued at $1,187,000, the 
Burbank franchise worth $363,150, the family residence in Pa-
cific Palisades, valued at approximately $700,000, and various 
smaller investments. 
The trial court entered an interlocutory judgment in May 
1984, awarding the Burbank Burger King to James, dividing the 
smaller community assets and ordering James to pay June's ac-
countant and attorney fees totalling $105,000. 
In September 1984, the trial court entered its final judg-
ment regarding the community assets. The court awarded the 
3
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Hollywood restaurant to June because a Burger King represen-
tative testified that June was an acceptable franchisee because 
of the company's management training program. The court re-
quired James to fully assume the $227,000 debt acquired in dis-
solving the Allenstein partnership and awarded him the family 
home. June was ordered to pay him $96,620 to balance the prop-
erty distribution. 
The court denied James' motion for reconsideration despite 
the fact that he tendered a $394,000 check to June, believing the 
court might award the Hollywood restaurant to him and the 
family home to June. The court also denied James' motion for a 
new trial. He appealed. 
On appeal, James contended that the trial court abused its 
discretion in: (1) awarding the Hollywood Burger King to June 
and the $227,000 debt to him; and (2) requiring him to pay 
June's accountant and attorney fees. 
James argued that he should have received the Hollywood 
Burger King because he had the skills required to run the res-
taurant and needed the cash flow to service his business debt. 
He asserted that June had no business experience. James relied 
on California Civil Code section 4800 (b)(1)1 which authorizes 
the trial court to divide assets in any way necessary to obtain an 
equal division of the community property. 
The court of appeal stated that the trial court carefully con-
sidered the appropriate distribution of the community assets. 
The trial court based its conclusions on: (1) June's need for the 
restaurant income to support the couple's three children; (2) evi-
dence establishing that June could run the restaurant as well as 
James because he had no special training when he started the 
franchise; (3) the couple's inability to reach an acceptable cash 
settlement; and (4) the opportunity for June to support the fam-
ily without relying on support from James because of the bitter-
ness between the parties. 
1. California Civil Code § 4800 (b)(1) provides: "Where economic circumstances 
warrant, the court may award any asset to one party on such conditions as it deems 
proper to effect a substantially equal division of the property." CAL. CN. CODE § 4800 
(b)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). 
4
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The court further held that the trial court's decision did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. The cases upon which James 
relied to support his contention were not controlling. In In re 
Marriage of Burlini,2 the court of appeal affirmed an award of a 
coin laundry business to the husband because he had the special 
skills required to repair the old laundry equipment without 
which the company could not survive. In In re Marriage of 
Smith,3 the court of appeal held that the family custom sign-
making business must be awarded to the husband because the 
business required his technical knowledge and his wife per-
formed only clerical tasks. Based on James' description of his 
duties in running the Hollywood Burger King, the court found 
that June could discharge those duties equally as well once she 
was trained by the franchisor. The trial court found and the rec-
ord supported the fact that no particular expertise is required to 
run a Burger King Restaurant franchise. 
Furthermore, the court of appeal did not read California 
Civil Code section 5125(d)4 as requiring that separate family 
businesses be awarded to the operating spouse. Section 5125 (d) 
states that a spouse who operates a business that is community 
personal property has the sole management and control of that 
business. In Goss v. Edwards/> the court of appeal relied on sec-
tion 5125 (d) to legitimize the wife's voting trust which gave her 
former husband the right to vote her shares in a company that 
he had established and operated. Here, the court of appeal did 
not view the Goss interpretation as requiring that family busi-
nesses be awarded to the operating spouse. The court of appeal 
also considered James' argument that he needed the business in-
come to service the Allenstein partnership debt to be without 
merit James had sufficient means to pay the debt and actually 
stated it was proper that he should assume the debt based on 
the distribution scheme. 
The court also found no abuse of discretion in requiring 
2. 143 Cal. App. 3d 65, 191 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1983). 
3. 79 Cal. App. 3d 725, 145 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1978). 
4. California Civil Code § 5125 (d) provides: "A spouse who is operating or manag-
ing a business or an interest in a business which is community personal property has the 
sole management and control of the business or interest." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(d) 
(West 1983 & Supp. 1987). 
5." 68 Cal. App. 3d 264, 137 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1977). 
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James to pay June's accountant and attorney fees. On appeal, 
James argued that the evidence did not establish that June was 
unable to payor that he was better able to pay the fees. James 
further argued that the fees were unreasonable. The court of ap-
peal quickly dispensed with both arguments. Extensive testi-
mony at trial established that the fees had reached such large 
proportions due to James' lack of cooperation, dilatory tactics 
and withdrawal from a settlement. The court of appeal affirmed 
the fee award to June. 
The result in Kozen is beneficial to women involved in mar-
ital dissolution actions for two reasons. First, the decision recog-
nizes that a husband's support payments are neither the only 
nor the best way to provide for the wife and children upon disso-
lution. As here, the wife may be given the opportunity to: (1) 
support herself out of the community assets; (2) acquire new 
skills through training; and (3) maintain her independence and 
dignity without continuing reliance on her husband's support 
checks. Second, the difficulty so many women have encountered 
in actually obtaining the monthly support checks is alleviated by 
allowing the wife to support herself. 
Linda S. MacDonald 
2. Time basis is proper method to determine community prop-
erty interest in stock options during marriage and exercisa-
ble after options during marriage and exercisable after 
separation. 
In re Marriage of Harrison, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1216, 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 234 (Fourth Dist. 1986). In In re Marriage of Harrison the 
California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's use of a time-
based formula to allocate community and separate property in-
terests in stock options granted during marriage and exercisable 
after separation. 1 On appeal the court further found that the 
1. The community interest was calculated by creating a fraction: The total number 
of days between the signing or granting of the option agreement and the date of separa· 
tion was divided by the total number of days from the signing or granting of the option 
agreement and the day on which each portion of the option became fully vested and not 
subject to divestment. After reimbursement to the husband for the purchase of the op-
6
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating spousal 
support. However, the court of appeal concluded that the trial 
court erred in providing for a step down spousal support award 
and in granting husband full credit for repayment of a 
preseparation loan. 
During the parties five and one half year marriage the hus-
band was granted four options to purchase shares of stock in the 
company where he was employed. Of these stock options, one 
was qualified and three were nonqualified.2 As of the date of 
husband and wife's separation, the qualified stock option was 
not fully exercised and the stock purchased under the nonquali-
fied options was not fully vested.3 At the time of trial, wife did 
not offer any evidence of the value of the options. However the 
husband had a certified public accountant testify as to the value 
of the stock options. In addition there was uncontradicted testi-
mony that the stock options were granted by the employer as 
"golden handcuffs" to encourage husband to stay with the com-
pany. To establish the wife's share of the stock options the trial 
court used a time formula which apportioned the community in-
terest in the stock options as a direct function of the length of 
the marriage. The wife appealed the method used by the trial 
court to determine the community property interest in the stock 
options. 
Relying on In re Marriage of Hug,4 the court of appeal in 
tion and any taxes paid thereon in connection with the exercise of the option, the com-
munity property interest was determined by dividing the fraction into the gain on the 
stock option on the date of exercise. 
2. The qualified stock option gave husband the right to buy 2,500 shares of nonfor-
feitable company stock in 25 percent increments on specified dates. The nonqualified 
stock options gave the husband the immediate right to purchase 100 percent of the com-
pany stock covered by the option. However the stock was subject to forfeiture to the 
company if the husband was terminated from his job with cause or if he left without 
company consent. The forfeiture provision lapsed in 20 percent increments beginning 
two years after the stock was issued. 
3. The court of appeal stated that the term "vested" is used in family law cases to 
define the point in time when retirement benefits are not subject to forfeiture if the 
employment relationship terminates before retirement. The court of appeal concluded 
that the husband's rights in the stock purchased under the nonqualified stock options 
were analogous to vested pension rights because the stock was subject to forfeiture. 
4. 154 Cal. App. 3d 780, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676 (First Dist. 1984) (where community 
property interest in unvested rights of employee fringe benefits is substantially related,to 
the number of years of employment, the time rule is the appropriate method to allocate 
the parties' respective interests in the benefits at time of dissolution). 
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Harrison held that the trial court's use of the time rule to estab-
lish the parties' respective interests in the stock options was 
proper. However the Harrison court stated that the denominator 
in the trial court's formula was technically incorrect because it 
referred to the total numb~r of days from the granting of the 
option until the option becomes fully vested. Although hus-
band's rights in the stock purchased pursuant to the nonquali-
fied stock options did not vest until the forfeiture provisions 
lapsed, his rights in the options vested on the day that each was 
granted. Therefore the denominator would be one and the ratio 
defining the community property would exceed 100 percent. The 
court of appeal concluded that since the trial court's intention 
could be reasonably inferred, the error did not require reversal. 
The court corrected the formula by deleting the word "option" 
and inserting "[s]tock received pursuant to the exercise of the 
option." 
The wife argued that the trial court erred in calculating the 
community property interest in the stock options based on the 
date the options were granted instead of the date that the hus-
band's employment with the company commenced. In Hug the 
court of appeal found that the proper date to use was the date 
employment commenced because the circumstances involved in 
the granting of the stock options indicated that they were 
granted as ~ompensation for past rather than future services.5 
The court of appeal in Harrison concluded that there was no 
evidence to show that the stock options were used initially to 
attract husband to the company or that they were issued as de-
ferred compensation for past services. Thus, the court of appeal 
held that the stock options were granted to husband based on 
his skill and effort as of the date of granting and therefore there 
was a logical basis for using that date in the formula. 
The wife alleged that the trial court erred in determining 
the tax liability incurred by her husband as a result of purchas-
ing stock through the option agreements. The court of appeal 
held that pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 836 the 
5. [d. at 790, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 683. 
6. Internal Revenue Code section 83(a) provides in pertinent part: 
If, in connection with performance' of services, property is 
transferred to any person other than the person for whom 
such services are performed. . . the amount. . . paid for such 
8
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trial court properly valued the stock as of the date the restric-
tions were removed. 
The wife also argued that the trial court erred in awarding 
her cash rather than a proportionate share of stock. The court of 
appeal held that the argument was without merit because the 
wife specifically requested a cash award at trial. Although the 
court of appeal could have dismissed the wife's appeal of the 
trial court's disposition of the stock options based on the wife's 
acceptance of the benefits of the judgment, the court stated that 
they preferred to reach the merits of the case. 
The court of appeal found that the trial court erred in rely-
ing on In re Marriage of Epstein? to allow husband full reim-
bursement for paying the balance of a preseparation loan. The 
Harrison court concluded that as the stock purchased with the 
loan proceeds had a community interest, the husband was only 
entitled to a credit for the amount paid on the community obli-
gation. Based on the time formula the court of appeal in Harri-
son calculated that 55 percent of the stock represented commu-
nity property and therefore the judgment should be modified to 
award wife an additional $9,810. 
The wife claimed that the trial court abused its discretion 
. by refusing to rule on spousal support, in ordering step down 
spousal support, and by terminating jurisdiction over spousal 
support.s Since the record showed that the trial court ordered 
property, shall be included in the gross income of the person 
who performed such services in the first taxable year in which 
the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such 
property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial 
risk of forfeiture . • • • 
1.R.C. § 83(a) (1984). 
7. 24 Cal. 3d 76, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413, 592 P.2d 1165 (1979) (party using his or her 
separate property after separation to pay preexisting community obligations is entitled 
to reimbursement). 
8. At the order to show cause hearing in October 1979, the trial court ordered the 
husband to pay spousal support of $800 a month, wife's medical and dental bills, the 
house payment and various other bills related to the family home. The interlocutory 
judgment of dissolution continued the $800 monthly support order plus the house pay-
ment and medical insurance until August 1981. From August 1981 to May 1982 spousal 
support was reduced to $400 a month and the house payment. Medical insurance contin-
ued from August 1981 until February 1981 at which time the husband only had to pay 
the wife's insurance in excess of $50 monthly. After May 1982 the trial court awarded 
$5,000 as an advance of community property for the purpose of assisting the wife. At the 
9
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spousal support to be paid to wife at the order to show cause 
hearing and at the interlocutory judgment of dissolution, the 
court of appeal concluded that there was no basis to the claini 
that the trial court refused to rule on spousal support. The court 
of appeal further held that because there was evidence that the 
wife was employable, the trial court did not exceed its discretion 
by terminating jurisdiction over spousal support. Finally the 
court of appeal found that there was no factual basis to justify a 
stepdown scheme for spousal support. Accordingly, the court of 
appeal modified the judgment to award the wife the difference 
between the original amount of support awarded and the 
amount that support had been periodically reduced. 
This case points to the difficulties that arise upon dissolu-
tion when it is necessary to establish the value of employee stock 
options that are not exercisable or have not vested. In Harrison 
the court of appeal found it to be "inexplicable" that the wife 
did not offer any evidence as to the value of the options. Al-
though the trial court is bound to dispose of the community as-
sets equitably, the court need not look beyond the evidence 
presented when determining the value of assets that also have a 
separate property component. Thus, it appears that it would be 
in each party's best interest to pursue all possible methods for 
placing a value on the community assets arid to be prepared to 
present the burdens and benefits of each calculation at trial~ 
Kate Blackburn Rockas 
3. The state court that issues an initial child custody decree 
retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify that de-
cree providing that the child or any of the parties remains 
a resident of that state. 
In re Marriage of Pedowitz, 179 Cal. App. 3d 992, 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 186 (5th Dist. 1986). The court of appeal in In re Marriage 
of Pedowitz held that there was insufficient evidence to find that 
the husband had remained a California resident so as to convey 
April 1983 hearing the trial court terminated jurisdiction to award further spousal 
support. 
10
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exclusive continuing jurisdiction over modification of a marital 
dissolution/child custody decree of the California Superior 
Court. 
Neal and Mindy Pedowitz were married in 1977 and resided 
in Fresno, California. In 1979 the couple had a child, Aryn. A 
marital dissolution was obtained two years later in the Superior 
Court of Fresno and the couple received joint custody of Aryn. 
Mindy was awarded physical custody. Neal was granted visita-
tion privileges provided he pay all travel expenses for Aryn's vis-
its. Shortly after the dissolution, Mindy and Aryn moved to 
Florida where they remained residents. Neal was in Florida from 
June 1982 to May 1983 at which time he stayed with Mindy and 
Aryn for approximately half of the time. The remainder of the 
time he lived by himself. The record did not disclose Neal's state 
of residence in the interim periods. . 
In December 1984, Neal filed a petition for modification of 
the marital dissolution decree in the Superior Court of Fresno 
County. The petition asked the court to require Mindy to pay 
one-half of the travel expense for an adult to accompany Aryn 
on the airplane for her visitation periods. After a hearing on the 
petition for modification the superior court decided that Califor-
nia had exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the matter and or-
dered the dissolution decree modified in accordance with Neal's 
prayer. Mindy appealed from that decision. 
During the same time period Mindy filed a petition in a 
Florida court to establish and modify the California decree and 
to reduce Neal's visitation privileges. The Florida court issued a 
decree modifying the California decree as prayed for by Mindy. 
Neal's appeal of the Florida decision is still pending. 
Both the California and Florida courts knew that proceed-
ings were pending in the other jurisdiction. Under the require-
ments of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdicition Act (UCCJA) 
when a child custody proceeding is pending in more than one 
state each state must stay its proceeding and communicate with 
its sister state in order to determine which state is the more ap-
propriate forum.! Neither the California or Florida court stayed 
1. CAL. CIY. CODE §§ 5150 - 5174 (West 1983). FLA. §§61.1301 - 61.1348 (Fla. Stat. 
11
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its proceeding or communicated with the other court as re-
quired. The issue presented for determination was whether Cali-
fornia or Florida had properly assumed and exercised jurisdic-
tion over the modification proceedings. 
The court of appeal held that the record did not disclose 
whether Neal had remained a resident of California in order to 
establish that California had exclusive continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the California decree. The court reversed and remanded 
the case for additional evidence regarding Neal's state of 
residence. 
The court of appeal first analyzed California's leading Su-
preme Court case on the subject, Kumar v. Superior Court.2 The 
facts of Kumar parallel those presented in Pedowitz. In Kumar, 
a marriage dissolution was obtained in New York. The wife and 
child moved to California while the husband remained a resident 
of New York. The wife later petitioned the California court for 
modification of provisions of the child custody decree. The trial 
court denied the husband's motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. On appeal the California Supreme Court 
held that deference to another state's continuing jurisdiction 
ends if and when the child and all parties have moved away. 
Since the husband was still a resident of New York, that state 
retained jurisdiction to modify the child custody decree. 
The court of appeal then discussed the requirements of the 
1983). California Civil Code section 5155 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction. 
under this title if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding 
concerning the custody of the child was pending in the court 
of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in con-
formity with this title, unless the proceeding is stayed by the 
court of the other state because this state is a more appropri-
ate forum or for other reasons. 
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the pro-
ceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody of the child 
was pending in another state before the court assumed juris-
diction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the 
court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that 
the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate 
forum .... 
CAL. CIY. CODE §5155 (West 1983). (Florida Statutes section 61.1314 is virtually identical 
to the above provisions of the California Civil Code). 
2. 32 Cal. 3d 689, 186 Cal. Rptr. 772, 652 P.2d 1003 (1982). 
12
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UCCJA. The Act determines when a state court may assume ju-
risdiction over a child custody proceeding. Its purpose, inter alia 
is to avoid just such jurisdictional competition and conflict as 
presented in Pedowitz by establishing guidelines for the resolu-
tion of jurisdictional disputes. As discussed previously neither 
the California nor Florida courts adhered to the UCCJA 
requirements. 
The court of appeal next examined the Federal Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).3 Congress intended that 
the PKP A be applied to all interstate custody disputes. The 
Federal Act establishes when a state court may and may not 
modify a child custody determination. In general, the PKP A re-
quires that a child custody decree must be modified in the state 
that issued the original decree unless the child and all parties 
are no longer residents of that state. 
The UCCJA basically conforms with the PKP A. In deciding 
which Act controls, the court of appeal in Pedowitz was per-
suaded by out of state authorities that the federal law preempts 
the UCCJA. Thus the PKP A must be examined first for the res-
olution of jurisdictional disputes over child custody proceedings. 
Under the PKP A the jurisdiction of a state court which has 
made a child custody determination continues as long as that 
3. 28 U.S.C.S. §1738A (Cumm. Supp. 1986). 
The Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall en-
force according to its terms, and shall not modify except as 
provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody 
determination made consistently with provisions of this sec-
tion by a court of another State. 
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a 
State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if 
(2) one of the following conditions is met: (A) such State (i) is 
the home State of the child on the date of the commencement 
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home within six 
months before the commencement of the proceeding and the 
child is absent from such State because of his removal or re-
tention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant 
continues to live in such State. 
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made 
a child custody determination consistently with the provisions 
of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsec-
tion (cHI) of this section continues to be met and such State 
remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. 
28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A (Cumm. Supp. 1986). 
13
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state "[r]emains the residence of the child or of any 
contestant. "4 
The court stated that the Kumar rule, the PKPA and the 
UCCJA all warranted the same conclusion. If Neal had remained 
a resident of California, the California court would have contin-
uing exclusive jurisdiction over the modification proceedings be-
cause California issued the initial decree. Neal failed to produce 
sufficient evidence to establish that he had returned to Califor-
nia after eleven months in Florida, with the intent to continue 
his California residency. Neal was unable to establish his contin-
uing relationship with California and thus the California court 
could not assume jurisdiction over the modification proceedings. 
The court of appeal reversed and remanded for the develop-
ment of evidence regarding Neal's state of residence. Only when 
the child and all parties have terminated their residency in the 
state issuing the original decree may another state assume juris-
diction over modification of a child custody decree. 
Women who move out of state and whose husbands remain 
in California after California has issued a child custody decree 
must seek custody decree modifications in this state. Thus the 
woman will have to travel to and secure representation in the 
state which issues the original child custody decree. The intent 
of the PKPA and the UCCJA is to simplify interstate custody 
disputes and to avoid competing decisions rendered by courts of 
sister states. These rules should facilitate changes in custody de-
crees and prevent unnecessary and duplicative litigation. 
Linda S. MacDonald 
4. An award of spousal support may not be based on the par-
ties' pre-marital cohabitation under California Civil Code 
section 4801 (a). 
In re Marriage of Bukaty, 180 Cal. App. 3d 143, 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 (4th Dist. 1986). In In re Marriage of Bukaty the 
4. [d. 
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court of appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in setting the wife's support award upon marriage dissolu-
tion, without considering twenty-seven years of the parties' co-
habitation. The wife failed to bring a separate civil action 
alleging an express or implied contractual obligation of support 
based on the parties' many years of cohabitation. . 
The parties were married in 1942 and divorced in 1954. 
From 1954 until 1981 they lived together intermittently al-
though the record did not disclose the frequency of their cohabi-
tation during that period. The parties were remarried in 1981, 
but their second marriage lasted only a year and a half. Hus-
band and wife separated again in 1982 and in 1984 the trial 
court heard the marriage dissolution and support proceeding. At 
the time of trial the wife was sixty-four years old. She had been 
unemployed for four years due to an unidentified physical disa-
bility acquired while working for the state as a switchboard op-
erator. The wife's age and disability severely limited her employ-
ment opportunities. The evidence at trial disclosed that the wife 
had savings of $20,000, monthly income of $394, and monthly 
expenses of $1,135. The husband had assets of $200,000 in trust 
deeds, monthly income of $3,302 and monthly expenses of 
$2,225. 
The trial court awarded the wife $400 per month spousal 
support for a period of three years. The wife contended on ap-
peal that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding such a 
small monthly allowance and in terminating her award pay-
ments after three years. The wife argued that in making the 
award the trial court should have taken into consideration the 
parties' years of cohabitation. 
The court of appeal discussed California Civil Code section 
4801(a) which establishes the guidelines for fixing the amount 
and term of spousal support payments.! The trial court must 
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1987). Section 4801(a) states that 
in making the award for spousal support, the court shall consider all of the following 
circumstances of the respective parties: 
(1) The earning capacity of each spouse . • • 
(2) The needs of each party. 
(3) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each. 
(4) The duration of the marriage. 
(5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment ... 
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consider, inter alia, the duration of the marriage and the rela-
tive needs and abilities of the parties. Under the terms of Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 4801(a) cohabitation is not a considera-
tion in awarding spousal support in a marriage dissolution 
proceedi!lg. 
The wife argued that the trial court failed to consider the 
fact that the parties cohabitated in the interim period between 
their marriages, establishing a relationship of some forty-two 
years. Wife contended that, considered in justice and equity, 
this fact rendered the support award inadequate and established 
an abuse of discretion. The court of appeal stated that the wife's 
failure to bring a separate civil action alleging an express or im-
plied contractual obligation of support covering the period of co-
habitation as found in Marvin v. Marvin,2 precluded considera-
tion of this factor. If the wife had brought such an action it 
would have been heard in conjunction with the marriage dissolu-
tion proceeding. The court determined that its jurisdiction was 
limited to consideration of the factors enumerated in California 
Civil Code section 4801(a) for the term of the second marriage 
only because this was solely a marriage dissolution proceeding. 
The wife further argued that the trial court erred in termi-
nating her support after three years. The court of appeal stated 
that as a general rule, support payments must be permanent if 
the marriage is considered lengthy. Case authority establishes 
that a lengthy marriage is one of approximately nine years or 
more.3 Under the facts presented this marriage did not qualify 
Id. 
(6) The age or health of the parties. 
(7) The standard of living of the parties. 
(8) Any other factors which it deems just and equitable. 
2. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976). 
[A]dults who voluntarily live"together and engage in sex-
ual relations are nonetheless as competant as any other per-
sons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights. 
So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretri-
cious consideration, the parties may order their economic af-
fairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from 
enforcing such agreements. 
18 Cal. 3d 660, 674, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (1976). 
3. See, In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979) (Nine 
years held to be the term of a lengthy marriage). In re Marriage of Vomacka, 36 Cal. 3d 
459, 204 Cal. Rptr. 568, 683 P.2d 248 (1984) (Eleven years held to be the term of a 
lengthy marriage). 
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as a lengthy marriage so as to prevent termination of support. 
The wife argued that nevertheless the parties' term of cohabita-
tion was analogous to a lengthy marriage. The court of appeal 
reiterated that the period of cohabitation could not be consid-
ered under the Family Law Act.4 The Act specificlUly prescribes 
the rights and duties of parties arising from the marital relation. 
If the court were to consider a right to support arising from the 
period of cohabitation, the purpose of the Family Law Act 
would be frustrated because the Act covers the marital relation 
only. 
The court of appeal recognized that length of marriage is 
only one of many factors to be considered in awarding spousal 
support. Nonetheless the court considered length of marriage a 
substantial factor because it reflects the commitment of the par-
ties and the stability of the marriage. The wife could have 
sought further support for the cohabitation period in a Marvin 
type action. . 
Finally, the wife contended that the support award was in-
adequate considering her needs and her husband's resources. 
Again the court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion in 
setting the wife's support award at $400 per month after consid-
eration of all factors listed in California Civil Code section 
4801(a). An abuse of discretion will only be found when an ap-
pellate court determines that no judge would have made the 
same order under the circumstances. Although the court of ap-
peal recognized that the trial court's determination may be un-
fair to the wife, there was no basis upon which to find that no 
judge would have reached the same determination. This conclu-
sion evidences just how broad the trial court's discretion is in 
determining spousal support awards under California Civil Code 
section 4801(a). The court of appeal thus affirmed the trial 
court's spousal support award of $400 per month for three years. 
4. The Family Law Act is codified at CAL. Crv. CODE §§4000 - 5004 (West 1986). 
California Civil Code section 4100 states: 
[d. 
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil con-
tract between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the 
. parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent 
alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by the 
issuance of a license and solemnization as authorized by this 
code ... (emphasis supplied). 
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In an age where many people cohabitate without benefit of 
marriage, couples would be well advised to enter into a contract 
regarding the disposition of earnings and property acquired dur-
ing the relationship. Women still earn less than men and fre-
quently cannot sustain the standard of living enjoyed during the 
relationship after it has ended. Furthermore, the older the par-
ties to a cohabitative relationship become, the more difficult it 
will be for the woman to be self-supporting if the relationship 
ends. In this case, the wife may still benefit by bringing a civil 
action to determine what support she may be entitled to on an 
implied contract theory. In short, parties in a non-marital, 
cohabitative relationship are only protected by appropriate fi-
nancial planning in the event the relationship ends. 
Linda S. MacDonald 
5. Donor of semen provided directly to a woman for artificial 
insemination may be declared the legal father of a child so 
conceived. 
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 
530 (First Dist. 1986). In Jhordan C. v. Mary K. the California 
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's holding that the semen 
donor was the legal father of a child conceived by artificial in-
semination. I The court of appeal concluded that when a donor's 
semen is not obtained from a licensed physician, the mother is 
estopped from invoking the nonpaternity provision of California 
Civil Code section 7005(b).2 The court of appeal further held 
that declaring the donor to be the legal father did not violate the 
mother's constitutional rights of equal protection and privacy. 
Mary K. wished to conceive a child by artificial insemina-
tion and to raise the child with a close female friend, Victoria. 
1. Artificial insemination is the introduction of semen of the husband or of another 
into the vagina otherwise than through the act of coitus. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
714 (5th ed. 1982). 
2. California Civil Code section 7005(b) provides: "The donor of semen provided to 
a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of another women other than the 
donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby 
conceived." CAL. ClV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983). 
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Mary and Victoria chose Jhordan C. to donate the semen. 
Jhordan personally provided Mary with semen and she con-
ceived by artificial insemination. When the child was born, Mary 
listed Jhordan as the father on the birth certificate and with her 
permission, Jhordan visited the child monthly. After five months 
Mary terminated the visits and Jhordan filed an action against 
her to establish paternity and visitation rights. Victoria joined as 
a party in the litigation seeking joint legal custody with the 
mother and visitation rights as a de facto parent of the child. 
Mary and Victoria appealed the trial court's order finding 
Jhordan to be the legal father and denying Victoria's status as a 
de facto parent. 
California Civil Code section 7005(b) is derived from the 
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).3 In drafting section 7005(b), the 
Legislature followed the UP A version verbatim, with one impor-
tant exception: the word "married" was not used. This omission 
provided both married and unmarried women with the statutory 
means to have children without the semen donor being able to 
assert paternity. Section 7005(b) also gives men the statutory 
means to donate sperm without the fear of being held the legal 
father. 
The court of appeal stated several reasons for holding that 
the physician involvement requirement in section 7005(b) is 
mandatory rather than directive. Health considerations, such as 
a doctor being able to screen a donor for any communicable or 
hereditary diseases is one reason. In addition, if there is ever a 
question regarding the donor's rights and obligations to a child 
born by artificial insemination, a third person may be able to 
clarify the original intent of the parties. 
Appellants claimed that constitutional principles of equal 
protection and privacy require that Mary be afforded the protec-
tion of section 7005(b). Mary and Victoria argued that as there 
are paternity statutes preventing a donor from asserting actions 
against married women, failure to provide the same provisions 
for unmarried women is a denial of equal protection. The court 
of appeal concluded that the argument failed because married 
and unmarried women are not similarly situated for purposes of 
3. UNIF. PAR. Af:r § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593 (1973) (adopted in California in 1975). 
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equal protection analysis. Citing Estate of Cornelieus/ the court 
of appeal stated that public policy mandates that, to preserve 
the sanctity of the marital institution, it is necessary to have 
statutes which presume that the woman's husband is the father 
and to prohibit assertions of paternity by anyone other than her 
husband or herself. The court of appeal found that the same 
considerations do not apply to unmarried women and thus there 
is not a denial of equal protection. 
Mary and Victoria also alleged that finding Jhordan to be 
the legal father infringed upon their constitutional right to pri-
vacy. Based on both parties' conduct the court of appeal con-
cluded that Jhordan was a member of the family unit and there-
fore declaring him to be the legal father did not violate 
appellants' right to family autonomy. The court observed that 
during the p"regnancy Jhordan visited Mary and she agreed to 
his purchasing baby furniture to be kept in his home. In addi-
tion, Mary approved of Jhordan starting a trust fund for the 
child. 
Appellants further contended that section 7005(b) infringed 
upon their constitutional right to procreative choice. The court 
of appeal reasoned that the argument was without merit because 
the statute did not impose any restrictions on the right to bear a 
child. 
In support of their claim that Victoria should be declared 
the child's de facto parent, appellants relied on Guardianship of 
Phillip B .. r. In Phillip B., the court of appeal found that perma-
nent residency with the child was not required to confer de facto 
parent status on a couple who cared for a disabled child on 
weekends while the child spent the remainder of the week in an 
institution. However the court of appeal in Jhordan held that 
because Victoria's visitation rights had been legally recognized 
by court order it was not necessary to address the issue of her de 
facto parent status. 
Although appellants were precluded from asserting the non-
4. 35 Cal. 3d 461, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1984) (conclusive presumption of paternity 
under California Evidence Code section 621, subdivision (a) is not a violation of a child's 
due process rights). 
5. 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). 
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paternity provision in this case, section 7005(b) has a positive 
impact on women in general. In enacting section 7005(b) the 
Legislature has sanctioned the conception and raising of chil-
dren by women without a legal father. Single and lesbian women 
benefit in particular because the statute provides them with a 
legal means to prohibit assertions of paternity. The counter-
vailing arguments against section 7005(b) are that the physician 
involvement requirement may prevent some women from utiliz-
ing the nonpaternity provision because they cannot afford the 
associated expense or because some doctors may be morally ad-
verse to being a party to the artificial insemination procedure. 
Kate Blackburn Rockas 
II. CRIMINAL LAW 
1. Conviction for rape with a foreign object upheld because 
under the terms of California Penal Code section 289 a fin-
ger is a foreign object. 
People v. Wilcox, 177 Cal. App. 3d 715, 223 Cal. Rptr. 170 
(2d Dist. 1986), modified 178 Cal. App. 3d 682f (1986). In People 
v. Wilcox, the court of appeal affirmed defendant's conviction 
for rape with a foreign object. The court held that: (1) a finger is 
a foreign object within the meaning of Penal Code section 289 
and (2) the trier of fact is not compelled to accept the opinion of 
an expert witness. 
Wilcox was the ex-husband of victim's roommate. He went 
to victim's home and engaged her in conversation. Wilcox then 
partially undressed her despite her resistance. He inserted his 
finger into her vagina and attempted to sexually assault her fur-
ther. A knock at victim's door enabled her to take refuge in the 
bathroom and prevent further attack. Wilcox admitted having 
inserted his finger in victim's vagina but argued that victim had 
consented until the interruption. Seeking to have his conviction 
overturned, Wilcox argued that a finger is not a foreign object 
within the meaning of Penal Code section 289. 
California Penal Code section 289 prohibits: 
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The penetration, however slight, of the geni-
tal or anal openings of another person, for the 
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse 
by any foreign object, substance, instrument or 
device when the act is accomplished against the 
victim's will by means of force, violence, duress, 
menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily 
injury .... 1 
Subsection (k) states: "'[f]oreign object, substance, instrument 
or device' shall include any part of the body, except a sexual 
organ."2 
Wilcox sought to prove that a finger is a sexual organ in 
order to take his act out of those proscribed by Penal Code sec-
tion 289. Wilcox offered the expert opinion of a clinical psychol-
ogist specializing in sex therapy who testified that almost every 
area of the body is a sexual organ, particularly the fingers. 
The court rejected this argument because under the explicit 
language of the statute foreign object includes any part of the 
body other than a sexual organ. Sexual organs are "reproductive 
organs."3 The court adopted "penis" or "phallus" as the defini-
tion of a male's sexual organ. Wilcox did not use his penis dur-
ing the act committed upon victim. In the court's modified opin-
ion4 issued a month after the original, the court recognized that 
various bodily organs may be used for sexual purposes but they 
were not therefore sexual organs./5 
The 1978 version of Penal Code section 289 specifically ex-
cluded body parts from the meaning of foreign object.6 Under 
that version Wilcox could not have been convicted of rape with a 
foreign object. The 1982 Amendment specifically construes body 
parts as foreign objects. If the meaning of foreign object under 
the 1978 version were adopted here, the 1982 Amendment would 
be abrogated. The court reviewed the legislative history of the 
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987). 
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(k) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987). 
3. Edwin B. Steen, Dictionary of Biology, at 495 (1971). Alexander B. Spence, PhD. 
& Elliott B. Mason, PhD., Human Anatomy & Physiology, at 755 (1979). 
4. 178 Cal. App. 3d 682f. 
5.Id. 
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289 (West 1970). Under the former version of California Pe-
nal Code section 289 a foreign object does "not include any parts of the body." Id. 
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1982 Amendment to Penal Code section 289. The Assembly 
Committee's digest stated that foreign objects include parts of 
hands or entire fists. Thus, the California Legislature intended 
to prohibit the forcible penetration of fingers into genital and 
anal cavities by amending Penal Code section 289 in 1982. 
The People did not present expert testimony to refute that 
many body parts are sexual organs. Wilson contended that his 
conviction could not stand because his expert's testimony was 
uncontradicted. The court held that the trier of fact is not com-
pelled to accept the expert's opinion if doubt exists as to the 
basis of that opinion. The judge or jury are free to analyze the 
foundation of the expert's opinion and to determine whether or 
not it is meritorious. Here the trier of fact rejected the conclu-
sion of Wilcox's expert witness. 
In upholding defendant's conviction for rape with a foreign 
object the court of appeal has accomplished two things. First, 
the court has adhered to the language of the statute and the 
intent of the legislature. Second, the court has protected women 
by recognizing that the forcible penetration of genital and anal 
openings by any means is a serious invasion of individual integ-
rity and ought, in good conscience, to give rise to a prosecutorial 
right. 
Linda S. MacDonald 
2. Under the 1980 amendments to Penal Code section 261 the 
state does not need to establish that a rape victim resisted 
the assailant in order to obtain a rape conviction. 
People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 721 
P.2d 110 (1986). In People v. Barnes, the California Supreme 
Court reversed the First District Court of Appeal, which upheld 
defendant's conviction for rape and false imprisonment. The su-
preme court held that the court of appeal committed reversible 
error by relying on the pre-1980 version of Penal Code section 
261.1 Section 261 was amended by the California Legislature in 
1. California Penal Code section 261 provided in pertinent part: 
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1980.2 Defendant's trial took place in 1982. The 1980 version of 
section 261 contained no references to the victim's resistance as 
a necessary element for a rape conviction. 
The events in question occurred on the night of May 27, 
1982. At approximately 10:00 p.m. defendant Barnes telephoned 
the victim, Marsha M., and invited her to his home. Marsha and 
Barnes had been neighbors and acquaintances for four years. 
Each had been to the other's home once prior to May 27th. 
Barnes telephoned Marsha twice more and she finally 
agreed to go because she wanted to buy a small amount of mari-
juana from him. She arrived at his home around 1:00 a.m. and 
Barnes was waiting outside for her. He invited her in to smoke 
some marijuana and at first Marsha refused, stating that she 
had to get up early and just wanted to pick up some marijuana. 
Nonetheless, Barnes persuaded Marsha to accompany him in-
side. They entered the house through an iron gate at the front 
door and then down a hall to 'a staircase leading to a room off of 
the garage. 
After ten or fifteen minutes of talking and smoking mari-
juana Barnes began to hug Marsha but she pushed him away. 
Although Marsha told him she just wanted to get the marijuana 
and leave, he continued his advances. When Marsha left the 
house Barnes angrily followed her out. When they got to the 
iron gate Barnes began to scream at Marsha. She asked him to 
open the iron gate because she didn't know how to open it, but 
Barnes "reared back" as if he were going to hit her. Marsha be-
came nervous, and the two continued to argue for about twenty 
minutes. Finally Barnes agreed to open the gate but said that 
first he had to go back inside the house to put on his shoes. Mar-
"Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of 
the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances: (2) Where a person resists, 
but the person's resistance is overcome by force or violence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 
(West 1970 & Supp. 1987). 
2. The amended version of California Penal Code section 261 provides in pertinent 
part: 
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a per-
son not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the follow-
ing circumstances: (2) Where it is accomplished against a per-
son's will by means of force, violence, or fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury on the person or another. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1987). 
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sha followed him back into the house. 
While putting his shoes on Barnes began to threaten Mar-
sha. He grabbed her by the collar of her sweater and stated that 
he could pick her up with one hand and throw her out. He began 
to tell her of his sexual exploits and stated that he could make 
her do anything he wanted. 
Barnes then ordered Marsha to remove her clothes. Marsha 
refused. He proceeded to make threatening gestures which in-
duced Marsha to comply. They then engaged in sexual inter-
course for about an hour and both fell asleep. 
At about 4:00 a.m. Marsha woke Barnes and coaxed him 
into opening the iron gate for her. She went directly home and 
phoned a hospital. She was examined and tested that day for 
venereal disease and was told by hospital personnel she could 
wait several days to report the incident to the police. 
Marsha called the police the following day. Her initial hesi-
tation was based on her fear that the police would not believe 
her. Barnes was later tried for rape and false imprisonment, and 
convicted. 
On appeal, the First District reversed the trial court's con-
viction. The Court of Appeal applied the pre-1980 version of sec-
tion 261 which required evidence of the victim's resistance under 
subdivision 2 as a necessary element for conviction. The Barnes 
court of appeal relied on the interpretation of section 261 (1970) 
found in People v. Nash:3 
The offense of rape is committed when the victim 
resists the act, but her resistance is overcome by 
force or violence. Although she must resist in fact, 
an extraordinary resistance is not required. The 
amount of resistance need only be such as to 
manifest her refusal to consent to the act.· 
The court of appeal then reviewed the record for evidence 
of Marsha's resistance and Barnes' threats. The court deter-
3. 261 Cal. App. 2d 216, 67 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1968). 
4. Id., at 224, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 625. 
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mined that: (1) defendant did not threaten physical violence 
against Marsha to make her succumb to sexual intercourse; (2) 
Marsha acquiesed to defendant's demands without protesting; 
(3) defendant would not have perpetrated the sexual act if Mar-
sha had resisted and; (4) Marsha only claimed to have resisted 
because she failed to communicate her resistance to defendant. 
In short, the evidence was insufficient to convict Barnes of rape 
under the pre-1980 version of Penal Code section 261. 
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to 
elucidate the requirements for a rape conviction under Penal 
Code section 261 (2) as amended in 1980 by the California Legis-
lature. The supreme court held that the 1980 version of section 
261 was controlling because Barnes was tried in 1982. Subdivi-
sion 2 of the 1980 version does not require evidence of the vic-
tim's resistance or of defendant's threats in order to obtain a 
conviction for rape. 
Barnes contended that the 1980 amendments did not 
change the substance of section 261 because resistance was never 
required to obtain a rape conviction. The supreme court rejected 
this argument stating that a victim's resistance was a critical 
factor in a prosecution for rape by force or violence. The Court 
noted that the crime of rape was established by a victim who 
failed to consent and showed resistance but whose will was over-
borne by force or violence. Despite Barnes' urging, the Supreme 
Court stated that although evidence of resistance goes directly 
to the issue of the victim's consent, when the legislature re-
moved "resists" and "resistance" from section 261 in 1980 they 
intended to make a substantial change in the code provision. 
The supreme court referred to the Legislative Digest and 
the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice's analysis of the 
code's am~ndment to determine the legislative intent. From 
these sources the supreme court found that the purpose of the 
amendment was to abolish the requirement that a rape victim 
resist her assailant in order to establish the crime. Studies have 
proven that victims who resist a rapist are twice as likely to be 
physically injured in the attack. Other studies show that prose-
cutors are less likely to bring charges against an alleged rapist if 
the victim has not resisted. Based on this information the su-
preme court stated that the specific purpose of the 1980 amend-
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ments was to eliminate the requirement of resistance in order to 
obtain a rape conviction. Furthermore, this change has affected 
the fact finding process in a rape trial. Revisions to jury instruc-
tions now reflect that the victim is not required to resist the rap-
ist on a charge of rape by force or violence. I) 
The Supreme Court went on to note that the 1980 amend-
ments wrought significant change on rape laws from a historical 
perspective. At common law a woman was expected to exhibit 
"utmost resistance" throughout the attack in order to overcome 
the presumption of consent. Furthermore a woman's character 
was put in issue and evidence regarding her chastity was ad-
duced at trial. Prosecutors viewed claims of rape as inherently 
suspect. Resistance served as an objective indicator of noncon-
sent while failure to resist implied consent. Thus, resistance cor-
roborated the rape claim. 
The Supreme Court mentioned recent studies which show 
that many women freeze in the face of sexual assault, becoming 
helpless because they are terror-stricken. Active resistance 
doubles the chance that a victim will be physically injured dur-
ing the assault.6 
Thus, the 1980 amendments to section 261 allow the victim 
to choose whether or not to resist the assailant and a conviction 
is not precluded by failure to resist. In sum, the Supreme Court 
determined that the purposes of the 1980 amendments to sec-
tion 261 were to eliminate resistance as a prerequisite to a rape 
conviction and to alleviate the victim's need to substantiate a 
5. California Jury Instruction No. 10.00 provides in pertinent part: "The crime of 
rape as charged against the defendant in this case is an act of s'e,xual intercourse with a 
female person not the wife of the perpetrator, without her consent, when she resists and 
her resistance is overcome by force or violence." 
CALJIC No. 10.00 (1979 rev.). 
California Jury Instruction No. 10.00 provides in pertinent part: 
In order to prove the commission of the crime of rape by 
means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily in-
jury, each of the following elements must be proved: 1. That 
the defendant engaged in an act of intercourse with a person 
[and] 4a. That the act was accomplished by means of force or 
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. 
CALJIC No. 10.00 (1982 rev.). 
6. Symonds, The Rape Victim, Psychological Patterns of Response, 36 AM. J. PSy-
CHOANALYSIS 27, 29-33 (1976). Note, Elimination of the Resistance Requirement and 
Other Rape Law Reforms: The New York Experience, 47 ALB. L. REV. 871 (1983). 
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forcible rape claim through resistance. The court also stated that 
according to People v. Salazar,7 it is improper to instruct the 
jury that it must find that the victim resisted in order to return 
a guilty verdict or for the court to rely on a lack of resistance to 
find the evidence insufficient for a rape conviction. Thus, the 
court of appeal erred in reversing Barnes' conviction ·using the 
pre-1980 version of section 261 which contained references to 
the victim's resistance. 
The supreme court went on to analyze whether the applica-
tion of the amended version of section 261 compelled a reversal 
of the appellate court decision. According the appropriate defer-
ence to the fact-finder, if substantial evidence supports the jury 
verdict, that decision must stand. Referring to People v. Thorn-
ton,S the court emphasized that the trial judge or jury has exclu-
sive authority to determine the credibility of witnesses and the 
truth of the matters presented. 
Applying the requirements of section 261 as amended, the 
jury determined that an act of sexual intercourse was accom-
plished against Marsha's will by means of force, violence or fear 
of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. In reviewing the facts 
stated previously, the supreme court held that the evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Barnes' rape convic-
tion. The appellate court's reliance on the pre-1980 version of 
section 261 was erroneous because the amended version elimi-
nates the need for a rape victim to resist the assailant. The su-
preme court pointed out however, that according to People v. 
Bermudez,9 the reviewing court must still look to the assailant's 
threats and their likelihood to induce fear in the victim when 
analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence in a rape conviction 
appeal. 
The· Supreme Court's decision in Barnes serves to clarify 
the requirements to establish rape by force or violence under 
7. 144 Cal. App. 3d 799, 193 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1983). 
8. 11 Cal. 3d 738, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267 (1974). 
9. 157 Cal. App. 3d 619, 203 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1984). 
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Penal Code section 261. Although new ground is not forged, the 
decision buttresses the provisions of the code and clarifies the 
reasons for its amendment in 1980. 
Under section 261 rape victims no longer need to physically 
resist their attacker in order to prove they have in fact been 
raped. Thus, they need not take their lives into their own hands 
and risk being maimed or killed. Futhermore, feelings of guilt 
for not resisting are lessened because the victim's resistance is 
not in issue at trial. The fact that a rape victim experiences fear, 
even unreasonable fear, is sufficient to establish the crime of 
rape under section 261. 
Linda S. MacDonald 
3. Multiple rapes committed on the same victim at different 
locations may not be separate occasions for the purpose of 
imposing consecutive sentences. 
People v. Craft,41 Cal. 3d 554,224 Cal. Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d 
585 (1986). In People v. Craft the California Supreme Court 
held that the phrase "separate occasions" as used in Penal Code 
section 667.6(d)/ which imposes mandatory consecutive 
sentences for certain sex crimes, applies only to offenses against 
the same victim when the perpetrator temporarily lost or aban-
doned the opportunity to continue his attack. The court found 
that defendant never lost or abandoned the opportunity to rape 
the victim and therefore, full, separate, and consecutive sentenc-
ing under section 667.6(d) could not be imposed. The court fur-
ther held that sentencing could not be upheld under Penal Code 
section 667.6(c),2 which gives the court discretionary power to 
1. California Penal Code section 667.6 (d) provides in pertinent part: 
A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be served for 
each violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section 
264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of com-
mitting sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 
or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate 
and unlawful bodily injury . • . if the crimes involve separate 
victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(d) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987). 
2. California Penal Code section 667.6(c) provides in pertinent part: 
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order consecutive terms for some sex crimes, because the trial 
court did not state the reasons nor the authority for imposing 
consecutive sentences. 
Defendant first raped the victim in a drive-in restaurant 
parking lot. Defendant then ordered the victim into the back 
seat of her car. Defendant drove the victim's car for about one 
hour, then stopped and raped her again. Defendant resumed 
driving and continued for approximately ninety minutes, stop-
ping once in the interim to lock the victim in the trunk of the 
car and once for an unknown reason. At the end of this time 
period, he stopped and raped the victim a third time. At trial 
defendant was convicted of three counts of rapes and sentenced 
to three full, separate, and consecutive terms. 
On appeal, defendant argued that his sentence could not 
stand if the trial court sentenced him under either subdivision 
(c) or subdivision (d) of section 667.6. Relying on People v. 
Smith,4 the Craft court agreed that if defendant was sentenced 
under subdivision (c) it was error because the trial court failed 
to state the reasons or authority for imposing consecutive 
sentences. The court stated that the question of whether defend-
ant's sentence under subdivision (d) was proper turned on 
whether the rapes occurred on separate occasions. 
In People v. Davisr, the California Supreme Court stated 
In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, sepa-
rate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation 
of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivi-
sion (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of committing sodomy 
. or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, 
violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury ... whether or not the crimes were committed 
during a single transaction. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987). 
3. California Penal Code section 261(2) defines rape as "[a]n act of sexual inter-
. course, accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator ... where it is accom-
plished against a person's will by means of force, violence, or fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury on the person or another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West 1986 
& Supp. 1987). 
4. 155 Cal. App. 3d 539, 202 Cal. Rptr. 259 (First Dist. 1984) (when the court 
sentences under subdivision (c) of section 667.6 it must state the reason for imposing 
consecutive sentences and for sentencing under this provision rather than under Penal 
Code section 1170.1(a». 
5. 29 Cal. 3d 814, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186 (1981) (where the statute is 
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that when interpreting ambiguous provisions of a statute the 
court "[s]hould ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to 
effectuate the purpose of the law."6 In People v. Black,7 the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that when determining legislative 
intent, the court should look to the words used in the statute 
apply their ordinary and generally accepted meaning. The su-
preme court in Black also stated that a court should consider 
the context of the entire statute when construing the meaning of 
one section. 
The court in Craft relied on these principles Of statutory 
construction to determine the meaning of "separate occasions" 
as used in section 667.6(d). Examining the language in the sec-
tion, the court found that "occasion" was subject to several in-
terpretations. Defined narrowly, "occasion" means "[a] particu-
lar time at which something takes place"; defined broadly, it 
means "a period of time in which an opportunity of some kind 
exists."8 
To clarify the ambiguity as to which definition of "occasion" 
should be applied to subdivision (d), the court looked at section 
667.6 in its entirety to establish the Legislature's intent in enact-
ing the statute. The court found that since subdivision (c) gives 
the court the discretion to impose consecutive sentences for mul-
tiple sex offenses while subdivision (d) mandates consecutive 
sentences, the Legislature intended to punish some offenders 
more harshly than others. The court concluded that the Legisla-
ture used the words "separate occasions" in subdivision (d) to 
single out those sex offenders who deserve an automatic imposi-
tion of consecutive terms. 
In order to establish the situations in which the court must 
unclear as to whether minors are exempt from the sentence of life iniprisonmEmt without 
the possibility of parole the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature when 
construing the ambiguity). 
6. ld. at 828, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 529, 633 P.2d at 194. 
7. 32 Cal. 3d I, 184 Cal. Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104 (1982) (when determining whether 
the Legislature intended the word "minor" as used in the second sentence of Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 707.2 to refer to the time when the crime was committed 
or the time of sentencing, the court should look at the words themselves and keep in 
mind the purpose of the statute). 
8. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1560 (3d ed. 1961). 
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impose consecutive sentences on a multiple sex offender the 
Craft court fo~d that "occasions" must be construed narrowly 
to mean a period of time in which an opportunity exists. Since 
each offense committed by a multiple sex offender occurs at a 
distinct point in time, the court concluded that if the statutory 
phrase was defined broadly it would be very difficult to distin-
guish offenders who merely assault someone several times on a 
single occasion from one who commits crimes against a single 
victim on separate occasions. Therefore the court held that sub-
division (d) only applied to offenses against the same victim 
when the perpetrator lost or abandoned the opportunity to con-
tinue his attack. 
Under the narrow interpretation of "separate occasion" the 
California Supreme Court held that although defendant raped 
the victim three times in three different locations, the offenses 
all constituted a single occasion because defendant never lost or 
abandoned his opportunity to rape the victim. Thus, the court 
concluded that defendant could not be sentenced to full, sepa-
rate, and consecutive sentences under subdivision (d). 
Based upon their conclusion that sentencing could not 
stand under either subdivision (c) or subdivision (d) the Califor-
nia Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court fO,r re-
sentencing. The court held that since their holding only related 
to sentencing and would not require any retrials it would have a 
full retroactive effect. The court further suggested that when 
trial judges impose sentences under subdivisfon (d) they should 
also state the sentence they would have imposed under (c) and 
provide a statement of reasons for such sentencing. The court 
concluded that this would prevent needless appeals where the 
trial court arguably misconstrued the offenses as occurring on 
separate occasions but would have had the discretion to impose 
the same sentence under subdivision (c). 
As a result of the narrow definition applied by the court to 
the words "separate occasions" as used in section 667.7 (d) it 
will be very difficult for prosecutors to plead and prove that full, 
separate, and consecutive terms should be automatically im-
posed against a defendant. This is especially true for multiple 
rape convictions where the prosecutor must prove as an element 
of the crime that the victim did not consent to any of the acts of 
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sexual intercourse with the defendant. At the same time, in or-
der to impose mandatory consecutive sentences for multiple 
rapes, the prosecutor must show that between each act of sexual 
intercourse the defendant did in fact lose or abandon his oppor-
tunity to rape the victim. It is difficult to imagine a situation 
where a prosecutor would succeed in showing that the victim did 
not consent to any of the rapes while proving that the defendant 
lost or abandoned his opportunity to rape the victim. The two 
concepts are inconsistent with each other. Thus, it is not likely 
that persons convicted of multiple rapes against the same victim 
will be subject to consecutive sentences unless the trial court 
chooses to impose such sentences under its discretionary 
authority. 
Kate Blackburn Rockas 
III. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
1. Male-only membership policy is arbitrary sex discrimina-
tion in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 
Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 219 
Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985). In Iibister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 
Inc., the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
finding that the male-only membership policy of the Boys' Club 
of Santa Cruz, Inc. (Boys' Club) violated the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act (Unruh Act).l The court found that the Legislature intended 
the Unruh Act to govern places of public accommodation and 
because the Boys' Club fell within this category, it was within 
the scope of the Unruh Act. The court also held that admitting 
girls to the Boys' Club would not contravene the purpose of the 
organization because there was no evidence that any of the pro-
grams or facilities were unsuitable for use by girls. In addition, 
the court stated that there was no proof that female member-
ship would cause serious or permanent danger to the Boys' 
1. California Civil Code section 51 provides in pertinent part: "[a]U persons within 
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex ... are 
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or ser-
vices in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 
1982). 
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Club's funding sources or with its relationship with the national 
organization. The court specifically limited the holding to the in-
stant case based on the particular nature and function of the 
Boys' Club. The court further stated that its findings did not 
preclude the legislature from amending the Unruh Act to allow 
the Boys' Club to maintain its male-only membership policy. 
The Boys' Club of Santa Cruz is a private, nonprofit organi-
zation which is affiliated with the Boys' Club of America, a con-
gressionally chartered organization.2 Approximately half of the 
funding- for the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz comes from a gift in 
trust donated by John T. and Ruth M. Mallery. The trial court 
found that the Mallery Trust was not restricted to use for boys. 
The remaining funds come from the United Way, local fund 
raisers and private donations. 
For an annual membership fee of $3.25, boys between the 
ages of eight and eighteen may use the Boys' Club's recreational 
facilities which include a gymnasium, an indoor swimming pool, 
craft and game areas, and a snack bar. There is not another fa-
cility in the area that offers the same range of recreational activ-
ities at a comparable cost for either boys or girls. In 1977 several 
girls were denied membership in the Boys' Club solely on the 
basis of their sex. The girls brought an action against the Boys' 
Club seeking an injunction and declaratory relief. The trial court 
found that the Boys' Club's membership policy violated the Un-
ruh Act and permanently enjoined the organization from deny-
ing membership or access to its facilities to girls. Defendant 
appealed. 
In 1897 California adopted its first statute prohibiting arbi-
trary discrimination in places of public accommodation or 
amusement.3 Since the statute specifically listed certain facilities 
falling within its scope, lower appellate courts relied on the prin-
2. United States Code Annotated section 691 provides in part: "The following per-
sons . . . and their successors, are created and declared to be a body corporate of the 
District of Columbia, where its legal domicile shall be, by the name of the Boys' Clubs of 
America .... " 36 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West 1968). . 
3. The Act of March 13, 1897, ch. 108, s 1, 1897 Cal. Stat. 137, (repealed 1959) 
provides that: "All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the 
full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, 
hotels, eating-houses, barber-shops, bath-houses, theaters, skating rinks, and all other 
places of public accommodation .... " Id. 
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ciple of ejusdem generis" to limit the reach of the law:~ In re-
sponse to a concern that the courts were construing the 1897 
statute amendments too strictly, the Legislature enacted the 
Unruh Act in 1959. 
The Isbister court relied on several California Supreme 
Court decisions in defining the scope of the Unruh Act. In 
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn.,6 the supreme court 
held that the Legislature intended the phrase "business estab-
lishment of every kind whatsoever" to encompass all of the 
places specifically enumerated in the original drafting of the Un-
ruh Act.'1 The supreme court in Burks v. Poppy Construction 
Co.,s stated that "business establishment" also included those 
facilities subject to the original 1897 statute, i.e., places of public 
accommodation or amusement. The Isbister court further found 
that other jurisdictions with statutes similar to California's 
equal access laws have used the term "public accommodation" 
to cover organizations like the Boys' Club.9 
[d. 
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (3d ed. 1961) provides: 
In the construction of laws, wills and other instruments, 
the "ejusdem generis rule" is that where general words follow 
an enumeration of persons or things • . • such general words 
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be 
held as applying only to persons or things of the same general 
kind or class as those specifically enumerated. 
5. The lower appellate courts relied on the principle of ejusdem generis to hold that 
only thpse facilities specifically enumerated in the 1897 statute and subsequent amend-
ments could not arbitrarily discriminate. See, e.g., Reed v. Hollywood Professional 
School, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 890, 338 P.2d 633 (1959)(private school not covered); 
Long v. Mountain View Cemetary Assn., 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 329, 278 P.2d 945 
(1955)(private cemetary not covered). 
6. 33 Cal. 3d 790,191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427 (1983)(condominium owners asso-
ciation is a business establishment under the Unruh Act and cannot arbitrarily discrimi-
nate against buyers on the basis of age). 
7. The original version of the bill extended its antidiscriminatory provisions to "all 
public or private groups, organizations, associations, business establishments, schools, 
and public facilities .... " Cal. A.B. 594 (1959). 
8. 57 Cal. 2d 463, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313 (1962)(construction company en-
gaged in the business of selling tract homes operated a business establishment within the 
scope of the Unruh Act). 
9. As an example the court pointed to New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination 
which bars sexual bias in "places of public accommodation"; these places are defined to 
include "places of amusement." In National Org. for W., Essex Ch. V. Little L. Base., 
Inc., 127 N.J.Super 522, 318 A.2d 33 (1974), the New Jersey Courts held that a local 
Little League was a place of amusement covered by the antidiscrimination statute. 
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Relying on these principles, the court in Isbister held that 
the Boys' Club is a place of public accommodation or amuse-
ment and therefore a business establishment within the scope of 
the Unruh Act. In reaching this conclusion the court stated that 
because the Boys' Club's primary function was to offer recrea-
tional facilities to boys, it clearly qualified as a place of amuse-
ment. In addition, the court found that the Boys' Club was un-
questionably public because it opened its doors to all boys of the 
requisite age. Finally, the court concluded that the members' 
lack of control over the organization's affairs and the nominal 
membership fee were characteristic of a public accommodation. 
The Boys' Club, its amici and Justice Mosk in his dissent 
contended that the term "business establishment" only applied 
to commercial or profit seeking ventures. Since the Boys' Club 
does not collect substantial fees nor does it have any economic 
function, the Boys' Club and Justice Mosk concluded that the 
organization was not a business establishment and therefore not 
governed by the Unruh Act. In support of their argument they 
relied on a statement made in Burks ,that defined business as a 
"calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the purpose of 
making a liyelihood or gain."lo 
The Isbister court rejected this argument. The court stated 
that when the Burks' definition of business was viewed in its 
entirety, its meaning became clear and provided no support for 
the Boys' Club's view. Secondly, in O'Connor, the supreme court 
held that a nonprofit organization could indeed come within the 
scope of the Unruh Act and thus profit seeking is not the sole 
criteria for, determining whether an organization is a business es-
tablishment. Also, the Isbister court found that since the Unruh 
Act governed places of public accommodation or amusement, 
additional attributes were not necessary to conclude that the 
Boys' Club was a business. 
The Boys' Club and its amici also argued that since non-
profit groups were specifically excluded from California statutes 
10. 57 Cal. 2d at 468, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612, 370 P.2d at 316 (1962). The entire sen-
tence reads: "The word 'business' embraces everything about which one can be em-
ployed, and it is often synonymous with calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the 
purpose of making a livelihood or gain." Id. 
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banning discrimination in housing and employment,11 the Legis-
lature demonstrated an intent to apply a strictly commercial 
meaning to the phrase "business establishment" as used in the 
Unruh Act. Relying on a statement made in Marina Point, Ltd. 
v. WolfsonI2 that the Fair Employment and Housing Act specifi-
cally provided that nothing in the statute shall be construed as 
limiting or restricting the application of the Unruh Act, the 
court in Isbister held that the Boys' Club's claim was without 
merit.IS 
The Boys' Club further contended that forcing them to ad-
mit female members would infringe upon the current male mem-
ber's rights of association as guaranteed by the state and federal 
constitutions. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,14 the United 
States Supreme Court held that a Minnesota statute prohibiting 
sex-segregated membership. policies by the Jaycees did not vio-
late First Amendment associational rights. Due to the Jaycees' 
character as a large, socially unselective membership institution, 
the court in Roberts concluded that the organization was beyond 
the constitutional protection of intimate association. As to the 
Jaycees' rights of expressive association, the Roberts court 
stated that the statute in question was not aimed at protected 
speech, but rather at satisfying a compelling state interest - re-
dressing historical discrimination against women - and there-
fore there was no interference with constitutional rights. Finding 
that the same reasoning applied to the instant case, the Isbister 
court concluded that admitting female members to the Boys' 
Club would not violate any male member's rights guaranteed by 
the federal constitution. 
Although the California Constitution affords greater expres- . 
sive and associational rights in some cases than its federal coun-
11. California Government Code section 12926b(c) provides that the "[phrase] 
'[e]mployer' does not include a religious association or corporation not organized for pri-
vate profit." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). Section 12927(d) of 
the California Government Code states that the "[term] '[h]ousing accommodation' shall 
not include any accommodations operated by a ... charitable association or corporation 
not organized or operated for private profit .... " CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12927(d) (West 
1980). 
12. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115 (1982) (landlord's no-children 
policy violated the Unruh Act). 
13. [d. at 731, n.5, 180 Cal. Rptr. 502, n.5, 640 P.2d at 121, n.5. 
14. 104 S.Ct. 3244 (1984). 
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terpart, the Isbister court found that given the state's sensitivity 
to sexual discrimination, there was no basis to find that a statu-
tory requirement .of equal access to the Boys' Club would offend 
constitutional rights. 
Plaintiffs asserted that the Legislature intended those types 
of discrimination specifically set forth in the Unruh Act be 
deemed unreasonable per se. In In re Cox/5 the California Su-
preme Court held that the list was illustrative rather than dis-
positive. Relying on additional arguments made in Marina that 
when amending the Unruh Act in 1974 to add a specific refer-
ence to sexual discrimination the Legislature did not intend to 
give it any special status, the court in Isbister reaffirmed the 
Cox holding and dismissed plaintiffs' argument. 
In Marina the supreme court left open the possibility that 
the Unruh Act might not apply to discrimination of an entire 
class if there was a showing of a need for specialized facilities. 
For example, the Marina court stated that the unique physical 
and psychological needs of the elderly might justify a housing 
facility reserved solely for their use. Since the Boys' Club failed 
to show that the organization fulfilled any special needs of males 
that females did not have, the Isbister court concluded that the 
Boys' Club did not fall within the Marina exception. 
The Boys' Club contended that its primary function was to 
combat delinquency among the male youth population of Santa 
Cruz. Although they conceded that delinquency also affects fe-
males, the Boys' Club argued that it had an absolute right to 
choose to only focus on the needs of boys. However, the court 
found that because there are no other recreational facilities 
available to girls in the area, the effect of denying membership 
to girls may create a greater delinquency problem than the one 
the Boys' Club was trying to alleviate. 
The Boys' Club further claimed that since the national or-
ganization's purpose is "[t]o promote the health, social, educa-
tional, vocational, and character development of boys .. . ,m6 
prohibiting the Boys' Club's male-only membership policy vio-
15. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992 (1970). 
16. 36 U.S.C.A. § 693 (West 1968). 
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lated the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. The Is-
bister court stated that in Perez v. CampbellI7 the United States 
Supreme Court held that state remedial legislation is preempted 
only if it "[s]tands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," and 
the congressional intent to preempt must be "unambiguous".18 
Looking to the language of the charter itself, which gives the 
Boys' Club the power "to adopt, amend, and alter a constitution 
and bylaws not inconsistent with the laws of the United States 
or any State in which the corporation is to operate ... ," the 
court found that the reference to boys was merely a passive rec-
ognition of the Boys' Club's then traditional character.I9 Thus, 
the court concluded that Congress did not intend the phrase 
"boys" to be interpreted as having a preemptive purpose. 
The court also rejected the Boys' Club's argument that they 
should be allowed to deny access to girls because the organiza-
tion had traditionally served only boys. The Isbister court found 
that there was evidence that a number of other Boys' Clubs affil-
iated with the Boys' Club of America, including some in Califor-
nia, have admitted girls with no ill effects. 
Finally, the Boys' Club suggested that its funding would be 
jeopardized if its membership policies were changed. Based on 
the trial court's finding that the Mallery Trust was unrestricted 
with respect to gender, the court in Isbister concluded that the 
Boys' Club's primary source of funding would not be endan-
gered. In addition, the court stated that there .was no evidence 
to indicate that admitting girls would not produce new sources 
of revenue for the organization. 
In concluding, Justice Grodin stated that the findings of the 
majority were compelled by the Legislature's broad anti-discrim-
ination policy. However, the court expressly limited the holding 
to the instant case and stated that their findings did not pre-
clude the Legislature from amending the Unruh Act to allow the 
17. 402 u.s. 637 (1971) (a provision in Ariz. Rev. Stat. s 28·U63(B) which provides 
that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the 
requirements in said statute, is in direct conflict with section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act 
and is thus unconstitutional as violative of the supremacy clause). 
18. [d. at 649·650. 
19. 35 U.S.C.A. § 694(5)(West 1968). 
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Boys' Club to maintain its male-only membership policy. 
Chief Justice Bird wrote a concurring opinion for the pri-
mary purpose of reproducing passages of the dissenting opinion 
written by Justice Poche in the California Court of Appeal. 
Chief Justice Bird stated that Justice Poche's opinion was im-
portant because he pointed out that a finding that the Boys' 
Club was not governed by the Unruh Act could mean that ser-
vices from nonprofit organizations such as the Salvation Army 
lunch lines might be restricted on the basis of race, sex, religion 
or any ?ther arbitrary classification.20 
In his dissent, Justice Mosk was highly critical of the major-
ity's finding that the Legislature intended the Unruh Act to be 
all-encompassing. Justice Mosk contended that if the Legisla-
ture had wanted the Unruh Act to apply to nonprofit and chari-
table organizations such as the Boys' Club, it would not have 
used the word "business" in the statute. 
Justice Mosk also faulted the majority's ·reliance on Roberts. 
He concluded that the United States Supreme Court in Roberts 
held that the Jaycees were subject to state-imposed sex restric-
tions because of the organization's commercial nature. As the 
Boys' Club is not engaged in commercial activity, Justice Mosk 
(ound that the "instant case was distinguishable from Roberts 
and thus, the club should not be subject to interference by the 
State. 
In his dissent, Justice Kaus21 conceded that facilities such 
as the Boys' Club are covered by the Unruh Act but he con-
cluded that the majority erred in holding that the exclusion of 
20. In his opinion Justice Poche made the poignant observation that: 
The trial court understood the clear meaning of the Un-
ruh Act Civil Rights Act: community services regardless of 
their source are to be provided in accordance with the legisla-
tive mandate of equal treatment for all. Perhaps the violation 
would have been clearer if the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz had 
discriminated on the basis of race, not sex. But that lack of 
clarity is not the fault of the language of the statute. Instead, 
the difficulty is the long and well ingrained tradition of 
women's dependency which even today causes statutory recog-
nition of the equality of women to have an unreal ring to it. 
21. Justice Kaus is a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under 
assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. 
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girls was unreasonable and arbitrary. Justice Kaus stated that if 
one of the Boys' Club's goals is to control juvenile delinquency 
and if most serious delinquents are in fact boys, then the Boys' 
Club had demonstrated a compelling need to maintain single sex 
facilities. Justice Kaus argued that the fact that there were not 
any other comparable facilities for girls was irrelevant to the le-
gal issue before the court. 
If organizations such as the Boys' Club are allowed to dis-
criminate on the basis of sex, then there is no reason why other 
private organizations which are open to the public cannot arbi-
trarily discriminate on the basis of sex, race or religion. To pre-
vent this from happening the California Supreme Court in Is-
bister has made it clear that "business establishment" will be 
broadly construed by the courts unless the Legislature takes 
steps to amend the Unruh Act to prevent such broad applica-
tion. Given the Legislature's demonstrated goal of eradicating 
arbitrary discrimination, it is not likely that the Legislature will 
interfere with the court's liberal construction of the Unruh Act. 
Kate Blackburn Rockas 
2. Male-only membership policy of Rotary clubs is arbitrary 
sexual discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act. 
Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary In-
ternational, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (2nd Dist. 
1986). In Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary 
International, the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial 
court's holding that Rotary International and local Rotary clubs 
were private organizations outside the scope of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act, l which prohibits arbitrary discrimination by busi-
ness establishments. The court of appeal concluded that the in-
ternational organization and the local clubs were businesses 
1. California Civil Code section 51 provides in pertinent part: "All persons within 
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex . . . are 
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or ser-
vices in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 
1982). 
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within the meaning of the statute and therfore the male-only 
membership policy of Rotary International was arbitrary sexual 
discrimination prohibited by law. 
The constitution and bylaws of Rotary International (Inter-
national), a nonprofit corporate association of local clubs, limits 
membership in Rotary clubs to men. Local club membership is 
restricted to a certain number of men from each type of business 
or profession within the community. 
To meet membership growth goals, the local Rotary Club of 
Duarte (Duarte) admitted three women members in 1977. Inter-
national consequently revoked Duarte's charter and terminated 
the local club's membership with the international organization. 
Duarte and two of the women members brought an action for 
injunctive and declaratory relief against the Board of Directors 
of International, the trial court found for the defendant. 
In Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,2 the California 
Supreme Court held that the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh 
Act) did not govern "truly private" relationships. The Isbister 
court defined truly private relationships as those that are "con-
tinuous, personal, and social [and which] take place more or less 
outside public view."3 Since International is a worldwide organi-
zation with more than 19,800 member clubs and a membership 
turnover rate as high as 20 percent, the court of appeal con-
cluded that Rotarian membership could not be considered truly, 
private. 
The California Supreme Court in O'Conner v. Village Green 
Owners Assn.4 stated that the California Legislature intended 
the phrase "business establishment" to be construed as broadly 
as reasonably possible. In O'Conner, the court held that a non-
profit homeowners' association which rendered business services 
was a business establishment within the Unruh Act. 
Relying on the legal principles confirmed in Curran v. 
Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts5 and Isbister6 the 
2. 40 Cal. 3d 72, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212 (1985). 
3. ld. at 84, fn. 14, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 158, fn. 14, 707 P.2d at 220, fn. 14. 
4. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427 (1983). 
5. 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1984) (Boy Scouts' organization exhibits 
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court of appeal concluded that International's complex organiza-
tional structure and vast number of employees were characteris-
tic of a business establishment within the meaning of the Unruh 
Act. Based on testimony that local club members obtained both 
commercial advantages and business benefits from their Rotar-
ian membership, the court of appeal found that Duarte was also 
a business under the Unruh Act. As such, both organizations 
may not discriminate on the basis of sex. 
Defendant contended that a court ruling forcing Interna-
tional to accept women members in California is prohibit~d be-
cause the judgment would negatively impact upon the organiza-
tion worldwide. The court of appeal found that there was no 
validity to the argument. Regardless, the court of appeal held 
that acts of sex discrimination in violation of the Unruh Act 
would not be tolerated. 
Defendant also argued that the Unruh Act unconstitution-
ally infringes on International's right to freedom of intimate and 
expressive association. Noting that this constitution right is gen-
erally afforded to highly personal relationships, the court of ap-
peal concluded that the Rotarian policy of encouraging a widely 
diverse membership body precluded the organization from quali-
fying for such constitutional protection. The court added that if 
the Unruh Act infringed upon the organization's right to free-
dom of expressive association, the interference would be justified 
by the State's compelling interest in abolishing sex discrimina-
tion by businesses. 
The court of appeal found that the trial court erred in con-
cluding that because International is incorporated in illinois, 
plaintiffs had to show why the validity of the organization's 
membership policy should not be tested under Illinois law. The 
court of appeal stated that neither the full faith and credit 
clause of the Federal Constitution nor the principle of interstate 
comity prevented a California court from enforcing the Unruh 
Act against a corporation operating in California. 
sufficient business attributes to be classified as a business establishment within the scope 
of the Unruh Act}. 
6. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 81, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 152, 707 P.2d at 217 (Boys' Club of 
Santa Cruz is a business under the Unruh Act). 
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The court of appeal further held that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying plaintiffs relief based on the unclean 
hands theory. The trial court held that since Duarte had admit-
ted women in violation of Internationars membership policy the 
plaintiffs had unclean hands and were precluded from seeking 
injunctive relief. The court of appeal concluded that to deny 
plaintiffs relief under this theory would be contrary to public 
policy and therefore the unclean hands doctrine was not applica-
ble to the instant case. 
The court of appeal held that plaintiffs were entitled to in-
junctive relief and damages. In Koire v. Metro Car Wash,7 the 
California Supreme Court found that in enacting the Unruh Act, 
the Legislature established a policy that arbitrary sex discrimi-
nation by businesses is per se injurious and that minimum statu-
tory damages shall be awarded for every violation of the Unruh 
Act as provided for under California Civil Code section 52.8 The 
Koire court further held that injunctive relief is an additional 
remedy available to aggrieved parties under the Unruh Act. 
The Rotary court's decision reconfirms the public policy 
mandate of California that men and women are to be treated 
equally. To further support the abolition of sex discrimination it 
appears that California courts are willing to liberally construe 
the term "business establishment" and to find that an organiza-
tion comes within the Unruh Act. The Leglislature's and court's 
firm stance against sex discrimination is paramount in eroding 
the male-only policies of many clubs and organization. 
Kate Blackburn Rockas 
7. 40 Cal. 3d 24, 219 Cal. Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195 (1985). 
8. California Civil Code section 52(a) provides in pertinent part: 
[W]hoever makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction 
on account of sex ... contrary to the provisions of section 51 
or 51.5, is liable for each and every offense for the actual dam-
ages, and such amount as may be determined by a jury, or a 
court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times 
the amount of actual damange but in no case less than two 
hundred fifty dollars ($250) .... n 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West 1982). 
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IV. TORT LAW 
1. The state is not liable for the sexual assault of a traveler 
at a highway rest stop when there is no causal connection 
between the claimed dangerous condition and the harm 
incurred on the premises. 
Constance B. v. State, 178 Cal. App. 3d 200, 223 Cal. Rptr. 
645 (3rd Dist. 1986). In Constance B. v. State, the California 
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. The court held that the facts presented were insuffi-
cient to establish a cause of action for personal injury resulting 
from a dangerous condition of property. Further, it declined to 
hold the state liable for personal injuries incurred on state-
owned property. 
While traveling late at night on Interstate 5, plaintiff 
stopped at the Dunnigan rest area to use the restroom. l The rest 
stop is a state-owned facility located in a grove of eucalyptus 
trees. Plaintiff parked her car in the lot and walked the fifteen 
yards to the restroom building. As she approached the building 
she saw her assailant standing at the northeast corner staring at 
her. Another woman exited the building as plaintiff entered. 
When plaintiff emerged from the first stall her assailant was in 
the women's restroom. The assailant viciously attacked and beat 
her, and sexually assaulted her. Another motorist heard plain-
tiff's screams, witnessed the assailant leave the restroom and 
noted the license plate number of his car as he drove away. The 
assailant was subsequently convicted of rape and sentenced to 
state prison. 
Plaintiff brought this civil action against the state, alleging 
that due to the dangerous condition of the rest stop the state 
was liable for the injuries she suffered as a result of the assault. 
California Civil Code section 830(a) defines a dangerous condi-
tion of property as: "[a] condition of property that creates a sub-
stantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) 
1. The Dunnigan rest area was built in 1967 or 1968. The State Department of Ar-
chitecture designed the facility. The south half of the building is the men's restroom and 
the north half is the women's restroom. The entrance to the women's restroom is located 
at the northwest corner of the building. There are no lights betweeti the parking lot and 
the building but the outside walls of the facility are well lit. 
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risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used 
with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable 
that it will be used."2 
Liability of a public entity is established by statute. Under 
California Government Code section 8353 a public entity may be 
held liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its 
property if a plaintiff can establish that the condition was the 
proximate cause of his or her injuries. Here, plaintiff needed to 
establish that the physical condition of the Dunnigan rest stop 
was the proximate cause of her sexual assault and that an as-
sault of this nature was foreseeable. 
Plaintiff offered the declaration of a security consultant that 
said the following factors created a dangerous condition of the 
property: 1) the restroom was too far from the parking lot to 
provide adequate surveillance by other users; 2) the restroom 
side entrances blocked the visibility of other users; 3) the loca-
tion of the bulletin board near the men's restroom distracted at-
tention from the women's restroom; 4) the placement of the fa-
cility :five feet below grade surrounded by trees obscured a clear 
view of the building; and 5) the placement of the lights and trees 
cast heavy shadows at night. Despite this testimony, the court of 
appeal stated that the material"facts presented during the sum-
mary judgment proceedings did not evidence a dangerous condi-
tion of property at the rest stop. 
Nonetheless, in support of this contention, plaintiff relied 
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830(a) (West 1980). 
3. California Government Code § 835 provides: 
Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for 
injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the 
plaintiff establishes that that property was in a dangerous 
condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proxi-
mately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous 
condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of 
injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) A negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity 
within the scope of his employment created the dangerous 
condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive 
notice of the dangerous condition under section 835.2 a suffi-
cient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to pro-
tect against the dangerous condition. 
CAL" GOV'T CODE § 835 (West 1980). 
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on Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District:' In 
Peterson, California Supreme Court held that the defendant 
public entity was liable to an injured plaintiff for harm occa-
sioned by untrimmed foliage next to a parking lot stairway. The 
foliage provided a hiding place for criminal assailants. The 
causal connection between the attack and the harm was estab-
lished by the defendant having occasioned the harm. 
The plaintiff also cited Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hos-
pital/' which established the rule regarding a landlord's duty of 
care to prevent assaults on tenants. In Isaacs, the California Su-
preme Court stated that the duty of care arises from the special 
relationship that exists between a landlord and an invitee.6 The 
duty to exercise a higher degree of care than reasonable care is 
contingent upon whether the landlord could reasonably antici-
pate that criminal conduct would occur on the premises. 
Further, past incidents of criminal conduct on the property 
are relevant. Here, plaintiff produced evidence that two daytime 
thefts had occurred at the Dunnigan rest stop but assaults simi-
lar to that perpetrated upon plaintiff had not occurred. 
The state argued that absent previous similar incidents, the 
conduct of plaintiff's assailant was unfor.eseeable. Therefore, de-
4. 36 Cal. 3d 799, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193 (1984). 
5. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 (1985). 
6. According to the Second Restatement of Torts section 332: 
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business 
visitor. 
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or 
remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for 
which the land is held open to the public. 
Comment a. Invitees are limited to those persons who 
enter or remain on land upon an invitation which car-
ries with it an implied representation, assurance, or un-
derstanding that reasonable care has been used to pre-
pare the premises, and make them safe for their 
reception. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). 
The Second Restatement of Torts section 341A states: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability to his invitees for 
physical harm caused to them by his failure to carry on his 
activities with reasonable care for their safety if, but only if, 
he should expect that they will not discover or realize the dan-
ger, or will fail to protect themselves against it. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341A (1965). 
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fendant was not under a duty to protect against such conduct. 
The Court of Appeal did not agree that assaults at highway 
rest stops were unforeseeable. It recognized that rest stops are 
open twenty-four hours a day and that all types of people, in-
cluding criminals, utilize the highways. It was therefore predict-
able that criminals may commit crimes while traveling. The 
court stated that the security of innocent travelers was a respon-
sibility of the appropriate state authorities. Nonetheless, in or-
der to recover, plaintiff was required to prove that a causal rela-
tionship existed between the alleged dangerous condition and 
the kind of injury incurred. . 
By granting the state's motion for summary judgment, how-
ever, the trial and appellate courts decided as a matter of law 
that the material facts show a lack of causality. The court of 
appeal reviewed a variety of cases to find the appropriate stan-
dard to permit the court to take the issues of breach of duty and 
causality from the jury.'1 The court is entitled to take the matter 
from the jury when the evidence would not warrant it reaching a 
verdict.8 Furthermore, to permit the jury to find that a condition 
is dangerous requires sufficient evidence to establish a substan-
tial, as opposed to a possible, risk of injury.9 The court of appeal 
also stated that the harm incurred must be of a kind that can be 
caused by the claimed dangerous condition in order to establish 
liability. The five conditions plaintiff tendered as the cause of 
her sexual assault were then examined. 
First, plaintiff argued that the restroom building was too far 
from the parking lot to provide adequate surveillance by other 
users. The court of appeal determined that no reasonable trier of 
fact could decide that the state's failure to remedy the distance 
between the lot and the restrooms constituted a breach of the 
duty of care. Thus the fifteen yard distance between the two did 
not amount to a dangerous condition of the property. 
Plaintiff next argued that the side entrances to the 
7. See Starr v. Mooslin, 14 Cal. App. 3d 988, 92 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1971); Pfeifer v. 
County of San Joaquin, 67 Cal. 2d 177, 60 Cal. Rptr. 493, 430 P.2d 51 (1967); Barrett v. 
City of Claremont, 41 Cal. 2d 70, 256 P.2d 977 (1953). 
8. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65 (1948). 
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.2 Law Revision Commission Comment (West 1980). 
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restrooms blocked the visibility of other users and therefore pro-
vided an opportunity for assailants to enter the building unno-
ticed. The court rejected this argument by characterizing side 
entrances as a latent condition that a reasonable landlord would 
not perceive as creating a substantial risk of injury. The court of 
appeal distinguished Peterson10 noting that the side doors had 
not been used previously as part of an assailant's modus 
operandi. 
Third, the court found the location of the bulletin board 
and the fact that the facility was five feet below grade insub-
stantial factors and could not reasonably be found to increase 
the risk of criminal activity. Hence, neither constituted a dan-
gerous condition of the property. 
Finally, the court of appeal considered whether the place-
ment of the lights and trees which allegedly cast heavy shadows 
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff argued 
that the shadows allowed an assailant to conceal himself and to 
enter the women's restroom unobserved. The court of appeal re-
jected this argument as unreasonable speculation, construing it 
as a theory of mood lighting. The court of appeal reasoned that 
if liability were predicated on the affect of the quantity of light 
on an assailant's psychological propensity to commit crime, then 
proprietors would become the insurers of public safety. As a 
matter of policy, the court of appeal was unwilling to impose 
liability on innocent landowners on that basis. In short, the 
court of appeal held that the lighting at the Dunnigan rest stop 
was not a proximate cause of the sexual assault on plaintiff. 
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Sims 
pointed out that the state did not adequately deal with plain-
tiff's contention regarding inadequate lighting in its motion for 
summary judgment. He felt the court overstepped its boundaries 
by resolving this issue in favor of the state, considering the 
state's failure to address it in its moving papers. 
The state relied on the Petersonll holding that there must 
be .prior similar incidents to establish liability. Mter the grant of 
10. 36 Cal. 3d 799. 205 Cal. Rptr. 842. 685 P.2d 1193 (1984). 
11.ld. ' 
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summary judgment in Constance B., however, the California Su-
preme Court reviewed Peterson and determined that prior simi-
lar incidents were only one element of foreseeability and not de-
terminative for the imposition of liability. Moreover, in both 
Peterson12 and Isaacs,13 the California Supreme Court decided 
that inadequate lighting could constitute a dangerous condition 
of property. According to Justice Sims, these decisions abrogate 
the trial court's ruling that the state is not liable as a matter of 
law for inadequate lighting. 
The trial court relied on the account of the incident found 
in plaintiff's police report. Plaintiff stated that she saw her as-
sailant staring at her as she approached the restroom. From this, 
the trial COUI:t inferred that the assailant was standing in the 
light, or conversely, not concealed in shadow. Therefore, the trial 
court concluded that the adequacy of light at the Dunnigan rest 
stop was not subject to reasonable dispute. Justice Sims consid-
ered this determination erroneous because plaintiff provided evi-
dence that'the rest stop lighting failed to meet nationally recog-
nized standards and the state failed to address this contention. 
The fact that plaintiff saw her assailant prior to the attack did 
not in itself resolve the issue of whether the Dunnigan rest stop 
was in a dangerous condition due to inadequate lighting. Sum-
mary judgment is only appropriate when there is no issue of ma-
terial fact to be tried. Nonetheless the trial court summarily de-
cided the lighting issue and deprived plaintiff of her opportunity 
to present the case to a jury. 
It is difficult to determine why the trial and appellate courts 
were so anxious to dispense with this case. Summary judgment 
is a drastic remedy and essentially deprives a plaintiff of his or 
her day in court. This decision will likely affect recovery in tort 
for assaults that occur in state parks and recreation areas as well 
as highway rest stops. The state is California's largest land-
owner. If recovery were allowed here, a potentially massive in-
crease in tort litigation arising from dangerous conditions of 
state-owned property could result. It seems that the court was 
not willing to expose the state to that much liability. 
12. 36 Cal. 3d at 812, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 849, 685 P.2d at 1200. 
13. 38 Cal. 3d at 130, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 365, 695 P.2d at 662. 
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In addition, the court may have viewed plaintiff's lighting 
theory as too speculative to warrant extended consideration. If 
the placement of buildings, benches, sidewalks and lamp posts 
on on state-owned property could be legally challenged, then 
every walking, jogging, bicycle and other accident would create 
potential state liability. Regardless of the court's true motiva-
tions, the implications of this decision are potentially far 
reaching. 
Linda S. MacDonald 
2. Independent injuries resulting from the same negligent act 
constitute separate causes of action in medical malpractice 
claims. 
Zambrano v. Dorough, 179 Cal. App. 3d 169, 224 Cal. Rptr. 
323 (Fourth Dist. 1986). In Zambrano v. Dorough the California 
Court of Appeal held that the statute of limitations did not bar 
Linda Zambrano (Linda) and her husband, Arthur Zambrano 
(Arthur) from filing a claim of medical malpractice arising out of 
a doctor's erroneous diagnosis made more than a year before.1 
The court of appeal found that plaintiffs' claims were for inju-
ries independent from those incurred at the time of defendant's 
misdiagnosis and therefore constituted a separate cause of ac-
tion falling within the prescribed time period for filing claims. 
Linda first saw Milford Dorough, M.D., as a patient in Jan-
uary 1977, five days after she had a copper seven LU.D.2 re-
moved in a hospital emergency room because she was experienc-
1. California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 provides in part: 
In an action for injury or death against a health care provider 
based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the 
time for commencement of action shall be three years after 
the date of injury or one year after the date of injury or one 
year after the plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable dili-
gence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs 
first. 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982). 
2. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 386 (5th ed. 1982) (intrauterine devices (IUD) 
are pieces of plastic or metal of various shapes (e.g., coil, loop, bow inserted into the 
uterous to exert a contraceptive effect». 
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ing abdominal pain and vaginal bleeding. Dr. Dorough diagnosed 
Linda's continuted pain as stemming from a miscarriage of an 
undetected pregnancy. Dr. Dorough admitted Linda into Hoag 
Hospital where he performed a dilation and curettage.3 Two 
weeks after Linda was discharged from the hospital, she re-
turned to Dr. Dorough's office complaining of severe abdominal 
and rectal pain, and he rehospitalized her. This time she was 
admitted to the University of California at Irvine Medical 
Center because she had no insurance coverage. He performed 
exploratory surgery during which he discovered a ruptured 
ectopic pregnancy;' Several days after the surgery, Dr. Dorough 
told Linda's mother that he had initially misdiagnosed Linda's 
condition. 
In May 1979 Terrel Bond, M.D., informed Linda that she 
needed a complete hysterectomy. At that time Dr. Bond indi-
cated to Linda that there was possibly a connection between the 
ruptured ectopic pregnancy and the condition requiring the hys-
terectomy. Linda testified that until she spoke with Dr. Bond 
she was not aware that Dr. Dorough's misdiagnosis could be re-
lated to her reproductive system problems. Two weeks after 
meeting with Dr. Bond Linda filed a complaint against Dr. 
Dorough and Hoag Hospital for medical malpractice seeking 
general and punitive damages. Linda's husband also filed a claim 
against the defendants for loss of consortium. The trial court 
dismissed plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that the one year 
statute of limitations attached in January 1977 and therefore the 
parties were barred from filing a complaint in August 1979. 
The court of appeal found that the applicable statute of 
limitations was California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 
which provides that a medical malpractice action shall be com-
menced one year after the plaintiff learns of or should have 
learned of the injury. The court of appeal stated that the word 
injury as used in section 340.5 referred to the damaging effect of 
the wrongful act and not the act itself. As a result of Dr. 
Dorough's misdiagnosis and his alleged subsequent refusal to 
treat Linda as a patient, the plaintiffs suffered emotional dis-
3. ld. at 397 (dilation of the cervix and curettement of the endometrium). 
4. ld. at 1133 (a ruptured ectopic pregnancy occurs when an impregnated ovum de-
velops outside the cavity of the uterus). 
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tress. Since a complete hysterectomy would permanently deprive 
Linda of her reproductive capacity, the court of appeal con-
cluded that this was a loss significanctly different than the ear-
lier transitory damages and therefore consitituted a separate 
injury. 
The traditional view prohibits splitting a cause of action in 
medical malpractice claims. As articulated in Sonbergh v. Mac-
Quarrie/' the general rule is that all damages resulting from an 
injury constitute a single cause of action. However in Martinez-
Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell,6 the court of appeal departed 
from the Sonbergh rule and held that the independent injuries 
plaintiff suffered as a result of taking a particular medication 
comprised several causes of action. The court of appeal in Mar-
tinez-Ferrer concluded that to deny plaintiff access to the courts 
for failure to comply with the statute of limitations would be a 
miscarriage of justice. 
Relying on Martinez-Ferrer, the court of appeal in Zam-
brano held that Linda's injuries constituted two separate causes 
of action. Therefore, since the plaintiffs filed their complaint 
against defendants two months after learning of Linda's need for 
a hysterectomy the statute of limitations had been met. 
The Zambrano holding is important because the court of 
appeal clarified the subtle distinction between splitting a cause 
of action and establishing separate causes of action. This is sig-
nificant in medical malpractice claims where injuries sometimes 
do not manifest themselves until after the statute of limitations 
for filing a complaint has run. It appears that California courts 
5. 112 Cal. App. 2d 771, 247 P.2d 133 (Second Dist. 1952) (a cause of action in tort 
arises when the wrongful act is committed and ignorance of the existence of the injuries 
will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations). 
6. 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (Second Dist. 1980) (the statute of limi-
tations did not bar an action against the manufacturer of a particular medication ~here 
plaintiff developed cataracts sixteen years after taking the medication). 
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are not willing to deny a plaintiff his or her day in court when to 
do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
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